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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that (1) social
networks may strongly aﬀect board composition and (2) social networks may be detri-
mental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a large dataset
on executives and outside directors of corporations listed on the Paris stock exchange
over the 1992-2003 period. This data source is a matched employer employee dataset
providing both detailed information on directors/CEOs and information on the ﬁrm
employing them.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd a very strong and robust correlation between the CEO’s network and
that of his directors. Networks of former high ranking civil servants are the most active
in shaping board composition. Our identiﬁcation strategy takes into account (1) ﬁrm
and directors’ ﬁxed eﬀects and (2) matching of ﬁrms and director along one observable
and one unobservable characteristic. We then turn to real eﬀects of such network
activity. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms where these networks are most active are less likely to
change CEO when they underperform. This suggests that social networks in the board
room impair corporate governance.
1 Introduction
That social networks aﬀect market outcomes is a well-documented fact (see Granovetter,
1973 or Rees, 1966 for early references). The precise mechanisms through which networks
operate are less well-known. To investigate such mechanisms, this paper focuses on the
market for corporate directors, a market where network eﬀects are likely to matter. First,
hiring the right individual is potentially diﬃcult: an outside director is both a part-time
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1expert and a supervisor to the executive management. These are very speciﬁc and potentially
distinct skills and a proper and transparent market for such jobs may not exist. Hence, being
directly or indirectly known to the management or the ﬁrm’s main owners and shareholders
is likely to be a strong comparative advantage to obtain a director seat. Social networks
are therefore likely to grease the wheels of such a market with high frictions, by providing
the management with information about the right candidates. Second, because the director
has supervising tasks, the use of social networks may come at a cost. Relying on executives’
networks to hire their own supervisor might conﬂict with directors’ independence and quality,
being therefore detrimental to corporate governance. Hence, the resulting impact of social
networks on economic eﬃciency is unclear. On the one hand, social networks can be used
by an entrenched CEO to ﬁnd an obedient supervisor or an incompetent expert; while on
the other hand, they can be used by a benevolent manager to facilitate her research of a
competent expert or of a tough supervisor. In this particular setting, as in many others, the
economic eﬀect of social networks is ambiguous and can only be settled through an empirical
investigation.
This paper examines this exact question in the case of France. It provides direct empirical
evidence that (1) CEOs’ social networks strongly aﬀect board composition and (2) that social
networks in the boardrooms reduce their eﬃciency: ﬁrms where these networks are active
are less likely to change CEO when they underperform.
To look at social networks in the boardroom, we use a unique dataset on CEOs and
non executive directors of all corporations listed on the Paris Stock Exchange over the
1992-2003 period. France is a particularly well-suited case when studying the prevalence of
social networks in the business elites because these elites are highly concentrated and (at
least some of) these networks are well-known, easily identiﬁed, and easily measured. The
sociological literature indeed documents that among French business elites two broad and
distinct networks coexist: engineers and former high-ranking civil-servants.1 Members of
these two networks are mostly recruited within graduates of two elite institutions: Ecole
Polytechnique and Ecole Nationale d’Administration. Firms run by CEOs from these two
networks account for 12% of all ﬁrms traded on the Paris Stock Exchange, and 65% in
asset-weighted terms. Not only alumni of these two schools are over-represented among top
executives but, most importantly, entering ENA or Polytechnique constitutes the virtually
unique way of entering high-level jobs in the civil service and, even more so, the “Cabinets
Ministeriels”, the politically-connected civil service jobs.2 Given these speciﬁc institutional
1For references in english, see Swartz [1985,1986], Kadushin [1995], Frank and Yasumoto [1998]. Refer-
ences in french include Bauer and Bertin-Mourot [1997], and Suleiman [1997a,b].
2As evidenced by Jacques Chirac, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Lionel Jospin, Laurent Fabius,... most
French politicians are former énarques (the second being also a former Polytechnicien), starting their career
2features, data on social networks are relatively easy to collect, using the French issue of the
Who’s Who, together with alumni directories.
More precisely, we gather background data on directors/CEOs (education, career, socioe-
conomic background) and match them with accounting and ﬁnancial information on their
employing ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst step of our analysis, we provide evidence of social networks in
the labor market for non executive directors. To do this, we estimate, for each individual in
our sample, a model of the probability of being hired in a given ﬁrm. The key regressor in
this model is the interaction between the candidate’s network and the network of the ﬁrm’s
CEO: if both are the same, the probability of hiring should be increased. This is our test
of the prevalence of networks. Because we exploit the full variability given by our matched
employer-employee data, we are able to account for two important dimensions of unobserved
heterogeneity, that are likely to (upward) bias our estimates of network eﬀects. The ﬁrst
dimension is the inherent ability of each individual to become a director in general, as well
as to be appointed in ﬁrms that have particular observable characteristics. For instance, top
level bureaucrats may simply be more intelligent than others and therefore more apt to run
and supervise large ﬁrms. Therefore, they would be present in the same ﬁrms both as CEOs
and as directors. Our methodology allows to account for this. The second dimension is the
ﬁrm level (unobservable) propensity to hire directors and CEOs with particular observable
characteristics. For instance, ﬁrms with an autoritarian corporate culture may prefer to hire
older directors and CEOs, and, say, civil servants may be over-represented in these gener-
ations. Or ﬁr m st h a ta r ea b o u tt oe x p e r i e n c ed i ﬃculties may be willing to hire politically
connected CEOs and directors. We give a formal proof that the data deliver enough vari-
ability in the cross section to identify network eﬀects, even in the cross section, while taking
these two dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity into account. Although some limitations
remain, the identifying power of our matched employer-employee data set is surprisingly
large.
We follow the sociological litterature and deﬁne three main networks: (1) former civil-
servants who graduated from ENA, (2) former civil-servants who graduated from Polytech-
nique and (3) Polytechnique graduates without any past in the civil service. We take all
other CEOs (possibly belonging to other networks, or to none) as the reference. Using this
breakdown, we ﬁnd that the probability of being hired in a given ﬁrm is larger when the
individual and the ﬁrm’s CEO belong to the same network, when this network is related
to a past career in the civil service. In addition, we ﬁnd no evidence that Polytechnique
graduates without civil-service experience tend to be employed in ﬁrms whose CEO has a
in Cabinets Ministériels and turning to politics in the sequel. In fact, the French elite comprises an incredibly
high fraction of former alumni of these two schools.
3similar background. We then look at hiring equations (ﬂows), instead of employment (stock)
equations. This allows us to discriminate between the eﬀect of the CEO’s network and the
eﬀect of past board composition, on each individual’s probability of employment. This rein-
forces our previous results: civil service related networks of CEOs still aﬀect the recruitment
policies of directors. The composition of the board has no signiﬁcant impact on the identity
of newly recruited directors. We interpret this as partial evidence that it is the CEO, not
the directors, who “shapes the board”. Our result that civil service related networks are
particularly active hold in front of robustness checks designed to account for possible sorting
of directors with ﬁr m sa l o n go n eo b s e r v a b l ea n do n eu n o b s e r v a b l ed i m e n s i o n .
The second step in our analysis looks at governance in ﬁrms run by former high-ranking
bureaucrats, as corporate governance is what the board of directors actually “produces”.
Following a large body of literature in corporate ﬁnance (see for instance Weisbach (1988),
or more recently Dahya, Mc Connell and Travlos (2003)), we focus on CEO turnover to
performance sensitivity. The literature documents that such sensitivity is in general higher
in well governed ﬁrms, than it is in ﬁr m sw h e r et h eb o a r di sc a ptured by the executive
management. In the spirit of Weisbach (1988), we ask if this sensitivity is lower when the
board has a larger number of insiders. While Weisbach - and most of this literature - classiﬁes
as insiders directors that are employees, former employees or suppliers of the ﬁrm, we classify
as insiders directors that belong to the same social network as the CEO. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms
with many such directors are less likely to change CEO when performance declines. The
eﬀect is large and statistically signiﬁcant for networks of former civil servants, consistently
with the evidence on networks described above.
Beyond the French context, we believe this paper contributes to two strands of the
economics and ﬁnance literature.3 Clearly, the present contribution belongs to the emerg-
ing empirical economic literature on social networks in markets (see for example Bertrand,
Luttmer and Mullainathan, 2000, Munshi, 2003). The ﬁrst important diﬀerence between the
existing papers and ours is the ability we have to observe networks at work in more direct
or more precise fashion, because we are able to look inside the ﬁrm, in which we observe
both the referee (the CEO) and the applicant (the director). Being able to look within the
3To some extent, the present paper also contributes to the sociological literature in that it analyzes a
much broader sample than elite scholars generally use (for instance, Kadushin(1995) studies 28 members of
the French business elite. Frank and Yasumoto (1998) look at a “broader” sample of 125 people.). Hence,
our description of the French “ruling class” goes in less details but is much more representative of the French
reality. Our analysis of recent changes in the French business elites is another contribution of this article.
Somewhat paradoxically, even though the State’s retreated from economic life in the 1990s, former civil
servants are more present among top executives in 2003 than ever before. We suggest that the very process
of privatizations of the nineties has caused this persistence.
4ﬁrm gives a lot of additional identifying power, which we explore in detail.4 In particular,
we develop a new identiﬁcation strategy and the ensuing (simple) estimation technique that
should be useful to people interested in social networks. The second important diﬀerence
between this paper and the existing economic literature on social networks is that we are
in position to provide a preliminary assessment of the eﬀect of networks on organizational
performance, beyond their direct “labor” market eﬀects. Most of the literature, in particu-
lar in relation to theories connecting job search and networks (Saloner, 1986; Montgomery,
1990), has considered networks to be a good thing for organizational performance: socially
connected referees suggest new names to ﬁrms, and ﬁrms punish the referee if the newly
hired is not as good as promised. Hence, in this theoretical literature, networks improve
organizational performance. However, in the market for directors that we consider, the re-
sulting outcome may well be lower organizational eﬃciency, as shareholders cannot always
directly “punish” the referee (i.e. the CEO).
Our second contribution pertains to the literature on corporate governance, and in par-
ticular the debate on the role of “independent” directors (for a review, see Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2002). Our results suggest that it is crucial to distinguish formal,f r o mreal inde-
pendence. While a director may be formally independent (not a customer, not a supplier, nor
an employee), she could well be tied with the CEO through a social network that prevents
her from standing openly against his decisions, or prevents her from voting him out of oﬃce.
Instead of raising the minimum fraction of independent directors, our research suggests that
transparency and competition in the recruitement process of directors may be more useful
than satisfying formal requirements of independence. While most academics now recognize
that the existing formal measure of independence is far from satisfactory, very few studies
have come up with alternative, possibly more relevant, measures of board independence.
On this last front, our paper is indeed very close to a recent study on French corporate
boards and the business elite by Nguyen Dang (2004) - which was unknown to us while we
wrote the present paper. Nguyen Dang’s paper focuses on corporate governance eﬀects, while
the present paper is much more on the evidence of social networks. Exactly like us, Nguyen
Dang has evidence that ﬁrms run by former civil servants are less likely to change CEO
in case of bad performance. He also shows - something we do not investigate here - that
CEOs from these networks are more likely to seat on each other’s boards (what the literature
labels “interlocking directorships”). Our paper devotes much more attention, however, on
presenting evidence that social networks indeed shape board composition - at least in the
French case. In particular, we propose a simple empirical strategy, and provide a formal
4Abowd and Kramarz (1999) who cover related technical issues never mention the potential of matched
employer-employee data for network analysis.
5proof that clariﬁes the identifying power present of the data, as well as their limitation. Our
approach can be used in many other context (social networks, matched employer-employee
data)
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the French elite from a historical and
sociological perspective. This allows us to present how we gathered information on networks
of outside directors and executives. Section 3 describes the dataset, providing additional
descriptive information. Section 4 presents the statistical model and discusses identiﬁcation.
Then, Section 5 looks at the extent of networks and Section 6 at their economic costs. Section
7c o n c l u d e s .
2 The French Business Elite
2.1 Historical Perspective on the French Elite
For both historical and sociological reasons, France’s economic elites have two distinctive
features (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1997, Swartz, 1985): ﬁrst, they tend to be drawn from
a handful of Grandes Ecoles, which form separated networks. Second, a large part of the
contemporaneous French business elite comes from the civil service, with relatively homoge-
neous and standardized careers. These two features are easy to observe and will guide our
empirical strategy.
2.1.1 The Tyranny of the Diploma
Bauer and Bertin-Mourot (1997) distinguish two particular features of the French business
elite. The ﬁrst one is “the tyranny of diploma”: college degrees, generally obtained before
age 25, tend to over-determine career prospects. Those students fortunate enough to obtain
the most diﬃcult and competitive degrees have almost guaranteed access to top jobs in the
administration and/or the private sector. The French post-secondary educational system
splits into two parts (Suleiman, 1997): the ﬁrst one is the usual university system, which is
both free and whose access after high-school graduation is guaranteed by law. Most French
universities have no right to select their incoming students; therefore, selection takes place
along the way, inducing students to drop out after 2, 3, or 4 years. Suleiman notes that in
the mid-1990s, this system comprised some 1.2 million students.
The second part of the educational system is much smaller (some 50,000 students), more
elitist and consists of a myriad of diﬀerent schools (Grandes Ecoles). In most of these schools,
tuition fees are negligible, but entrance takes place after the successful completion of a na-
tionwide examination with a numerus clausus. Preparation to these exams is carried out in
6special classes (classes préparatoires), and takes two to three years after high-school gradua-
tion. The bulk of these schools consists of engineering and business schools, though some of
the most prestigious Grandes Ecoles do not fall into these categories. The French business
elite is however mostly recruited within the two most prestigious Grandes Ecoles (Swartz,
1986): the Ecole Nationale d’Administration and Ecole Polytechnique. The Ecole Nationale
d’Administration (henceforth ENA) was created after the second world war to supply the
civil service with highly trained professionals. Ecole Polytechnique is an engineering school
originally founded by Napoleon to recruit and train oﬃcers for the French military during
the French Revolution, that gradually evolved into an engineering school. Nowadays, most of
the class enter the private sector, but the best students during their years at Polytechnique
(as measured by academic credentials, mostly in maths and physics) enter “en masse” the
civil service. Other prestigious schools (Centrale, Les Mines, HEC etc.), less represented
amongst top executives, have no tie with the civil service and all of their graduates join the
private sector right after school.
Grandes Ecoles graduates retain some ties after college not only because they studied
together and formed friendships there (see Kadushin, 1995, and Frank and Yasumoto, 1998),
but also through alumni networks and events. The number of people involved is quite
large so that the resulting networks are loose and uncoordinated (although some best selling
books of the early 1970s went as far as calling them “maﬁas”). However, having studied
in a Grande Ecole naturally endows a graduate with a host of weak ties within business
people and, for ENA and Polytechnique graduates, within the high administration. Partly
because of their ties with the civil service (more on this below), ENA and Polytechnique
have historically been the most prestigious Grandes Ecoles, in spite of or perhaps because
of, their small size. Together, they train some 500 new students a year. Firms appears to
value their social connection (in particular with the administration, more on this below),
their qualities, but also seem to rely on this elitist feature of the educational system to
produce legitimacy in their organizations (see the case study in Bauer and Bertin-Mourot,
1997, and also Burt, Hogarth and Michaud, 2000). As a result, they hire top Grandes Ecoles
graduates at the highest levels of the hierarchy instead of training and promoting employees
over the long term. This tendency for ﬁrms to hire managers from Grandes Ecoles dates
back to the XIXth century, though, at the time, most French ﬁrms were still family-owned,
and family-run. As some ﬁrms became more successful and larger, professional managers
were hired, and the top-level hierarchies started to ﬁll up with engineers from Polytechnique
and Ecole Centrale (see Cassis, 1997). In the mid-XXth century, ﬁrms started in addition
to hire civil-servants, as we see now.
72.1.2 Civil Service and Business Elite
The second feature of the French economic system is that a large fraction of its business
and political elite has spent its ﬁrst years on the labor market within the civil service. This
ﬂow from top-level bureaucracy into business started after World War I. Until then, the
State was small and held few levers over the economy. In those years, capitalists sought
to inﬂuence regulation through directly lobbying or by bribing politicians elected to the
Parliament or employed in the Government (Garrigues, 2002). During World War I, high-
ranking civil-servants had progressively risen to power as the State budget grew larger. In
the early 1920s, diplomats and employees of the Ministry of Colonies seemed to have been
particularly sought after by ﬁrms willing to set up subsidiaries abroad. In the 1930s, the State
started to intervene more heavily in the economy through nationalizations and regulation.5
At this point, the knowledge of the internal workings of the bureaucracy and the associated
connections started to be valued more strongly by private ﬁrms, in particular in the ﬁnancial
industry.
However, the big shift in the relationships between business and the administrative elites
occured after WWII. First, in 1945 the Government, then run by the unlikely coalition of
Gaullists and communists, two dirigist political forces highly involved in the Resistance,
t o o kc o n t r o lo fm o s to ft h eﬁnancial industry with the intent of channeling savings to pri-
ority industries under the tight supervision of the Treasury (Melitz, 1990). In addition, the
Government took over most utilities and some large manufacturing ﬁr m s( l i k eE D F ,t h ee l e c -
tricity monopoly, or Renault, a large car maker). The Treasury and the Ministry of Industry
therefore became, during these reconstruction years, the real centers of power in ﬁnance and
industry (Garrigues, 2002). Simultaneously, ENA was created, which dramatically increased
the supply of high-ranking civil-servants certiﬁed by a prestigious and restrictive selection
system explicitely based on education. The new prestige attached to civil service, along
with the creation of this dedicated school, created a new elite, mostly based on scholarly
achievement and sharing a meritocratic Republican ethos.
In a given class at ENA or Polytechnique, the best students have systematically joined
one of the ﬁve most prestigious bureaucratic careers, or “Corps d’Etat” (Suleiman, 1997 and
also Kadushin, 1995), training altogether some 50 people a year. The best Polytechnique
graduates were entitled to join industry-related “Corps d’Etat”, the famous corps des Mines
or the corps des Ponts et Chaussées. These career paths were designed to train future experts
5Most French airlines were nationalized in 1933 and consolidated into what is now Air France. The
national railways were created in a similar way in 1937. In 1936, a left wing coalition (Le Front Populaire)
came into power, got a ﬁrmer hand on the Bank of France (then the private property of France’s top
ﬁnanciers), enacted the “congés payés” (two weeks of paid vacations) and the 40 hours workweek (Asselain,
1984).
8in the manufacturing industries, to serve both as political advisors and top-level managers.
The best ENA graduates were entitled to enter the Inspection des Finances, the Conseil
d’Etat or the Cour des Comptes (again “Corps d’Etat”). These careers paths were designed
to produce experts in public ﬁnance and law (particularly important in a country where the
State has its own jurisdiction). The typicall successful high-ranking civil-servant career in the
postwar years involved a few years in the Treasury (for ENA graduates) or at the Ministry
of Industry (for Polytechnique graduates who joined the civil service), then as a “cabinet”
advisor to the minister of industry, ﬁnance, or the Prime Minister. With this experience,
they could then join the top management of a large private or a State-owned company. To
private ﬁrms, part of their value came from their “carnet d’adresses” (adress book), built
during their years at the top levels of the State, a very valuable asset in a country where
State presence pervaded all industries, be it through regulation, subsidies, ﬁnance or mere
inﬂuence (for an example of direct government intervention in a purely private ﬁrm, see the
example of the Schneider empire in Cohen, 1989).
By the early 1980s, ENA and Polytechnique graduates’ involvement in the top manage-
ment of French ﬁrms was pretty strong (see Swartz, 1986). It was even strengthened by the
1981 mass nationalizations undertaken by the then newly elected socialist Government. In
1986, a strong policy reversal was implemented by the center right coalition led by Jacques
Chirac: most of the State assets were privatized, with a temporary halt during the 1988-
1993 period. The State progressively lost its direct grip over manufacturing industries, the
ﬁnancial industry; it deregulated the goods and credit markets and reduced dramatically its
subsidies (for a description of this ﬁnancial liberalization episode, see Bertrand, Schoar and
Thesmar, 2004).
In the past 15 years, the State’s loss of power did not, apparently, change the way French
business elites were recruited. Half of the ﬁrms listed on the French stockmarket have no
controlling shareholder (Sraer and Thesmar, 2005). Top-ranking bureaucrats put in place
in the 1980s could remain at the head of their companies. With a congruent board of
directors, it was not be diﬃcult for them to choose a successor with similar background and
education in the 1990s. Furthermore, the Treasury set up a network of cross-shareholding
and cross-directorships (“the noyaux durs”, or hard cores) between private and privatized
ﬁrms (Garrigues, 2002). The oﬃcial goal of this network was to protect French champions
from an hostile (i.e. foreign) takeover. All these factors, along with further privatizations
in the 1990s, contributed to strengthen the grip of former civil-servants over the country’s
largest ﬁrms. This grip is still visible in 2006.
With these two features of the French elite in mind, we turn to a statistical analysis (next
Sections), but ﬁrst, we brieﬂy review recent sociological work based on contemporaneous data
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2.2 Contemporary Sociological Evidence
As evidenced above, personal and business relations between members of the French elite
have naturally developped from the bonds created during their post-secondary education
(see Burt, Hogarth and Michaud, 2001) and through common careers in the civil service
(Swart, 1986; Kadushin, 1995). This sociological literature has shown that these relations
have two prominent features. First, even though they most often resemble “weak ties”
between fairly competitive people, these bonds can also be very tight and described by their
members as true “friendship”.6 Second, the French elite can be broken down into diﬀerent
cohesive subgroups, within which friendship bonds prevail, but between which competition
and weaker ties are the norm. These two aspects will provide us with a simple way of
collecting hard information on social networks within the French business elite.
As it turns out, sharing common educational, social or occupational background is a good
proxy for “friendship relations”. Charles Kadushin (1995) studied the frienship relations
among 28 members of the “inner circle” of the French ﬁnancial elite (people whose inﬂuence
was the largest among 125 most inﬂuent Frenchmen in business and economics). Consistently
with the above discussion on the relation between bureaucratic and business elites, he shows
that a past career in the French Treasury is highly correlated with being part of this “inner
circle”, other things being equal.7 Moving on to friendship, he ﬁnds that two people of this
circle are more likely to deﬁne themselves as “friends” when (1) both are ENA graduates and,
most often (in his target sample), members of the Grands Corps, (2) both were connected
to the same political party (often because they worked as advisers when the party was in
government) and (3) when their past career included a few years at the Treasury. Also,
within his target sample, Kadushin ﬁnds that friends were more likely to seat on the same
board of directors. Hence, objective measures of elite cohesiveness so far used by sociologists
interested in elites networks, such as similar education, similar professional experience, or
board interlocks (on this literature see the review by Mizruchi, 1995) seem to be perfectly
applicable in our French context. While not entirely surprising - especially to French insiders
- this will serve our purpose well, given that our data does not provide direct information on
6Leslie Mitchell De Quillacq (1992), an american-born journalist, conducted in the early 1990s some 67
interviews among inﬂuential members of the business elite. In the words of one of them “Dinners, Luncheons,
breakfasts, tête à tête... It’s always the same who talk, always the same ones who are there. It doesn’t stop.
We meet all the time.” (quoted from Kadushin, 1995, p 210).
7As it turns out, membership to very exclusive clubs like Le Siècle, AFEP, Entreprise et Cité,... is also
strongly correlated with being a member of the business elite. We do not, however, have access to this (very)
private information and this clearly is a limitation of our study.
10the family or friendship relations between individuals, but only information on education,
socioeconomic background and past career. To some extent, Kadushin’s study legitimates
our empirical strategy, which relies on assuming that people with share strong features and
a common background within a restricted world will be either willing to reciprocate favors
(accumulating social capital through “reciprocity transaction”) or willing to maintain their
reputation vis à vis the same network.
A second useful aspect of the French elite is that its members tend to cluster into diﬀerent
subgroups within which social cohesion is very high and between which there is some level
of weak cooperation and competition (Frank and Yasumoto, 1998). Within subgroups (the
“Corps d’Etat” for example), a high degree of cooperation is the norm, and members seek
to accumulate social capital by building their reputation vis-à-vis the network as a whole,
and not towards particular individuals (what Frank and Yasumoto call “enforceable trust”).
With potentially competing subgroups, individuals tend to build ties based on interpersonal
reciprocity (”reciprocity transactions”) rather than construct a reputation with respect to
the entire (alien) subgroup. Using a somewhat diﬀerent methodology than Kadushin — but
the same dataset — Frank and Yasumoto break the French elite into three groups: right-wing
ENA graduates, left-wing ENA graduates and non-ENA graduates. Consistently with their
hypothesis on between/within subgroup interaction, Frank and Yasumoto ﬁnd that people
are more likely to engage in hostile actions towards members of other subgroups than toward
members of their own subgroups. In addition, they ﬁnd that two people are more likely to
engage in reciprocity transaction (help one another) when they do not belong to the same
subgroup. These results are useful when constructing our empirical strategy in that they
guarantee that various social networks actually do cluster the elite in several distinct and
observable groups.
3T h e D a t a
3.1 Data Sources
Our data set matches information on the employee — the CEO and the directors — with data
on the employing ﬁrms. To construct it, we used three main data sources: (1) the DAFSA
yearbook of French listed ﬁrms provides us with ﬁrm-level variables (including the names
of the CEO and of the members of the board), (2) the French edition of the Who’s Who
gives us socioeconomic, career and educational information on CEOs and directors. The
Who’s Who is however not exhaustive, hence, (3) for ENA and Polytechnique graduates,
Alumni Directories were used to obtain education and partial information on careers for
those individuals not listed in the Who’s Who.
11All French ﬁrms listed on the stock market are required to issue an annual report including
accounting information. Using the annual reports, the DAFSA yearbook compiles listed
companies accounts in a yearly publication. Available yearbooks go back to the 1950s,
but unfortunately, detailed balance sheet and proﬁt account information is only available
from the 1984 issue on. Given that French ﬁrm often take the form of business groups
with myriads of subsidiaries, corporate account are always consolidated at the group-level —
although the group leader is most often the only entity listed. We extracted this information
from the 1988-1993 paper issues of the yearbook, and from its 1994-2003 electronic issues.
We restricted ourselves to ﬁr m sl i s t e do nt h e“ p r e m i e rm a r c h é ”o ro nt h e“ s e c o n dm a r c h é ” ,
excluding those ﬁrms traded over the counter (“hors cote”) or ﬁrms listed on the “nouveau
marché” (a market for young, innovative ﬁrms which was created in 1995). The “premier
marché” consists of all ﬁrms whose market capitalization and volume traded are large enough.
The “second marché” is a market for smaller, in general fairly mature, ﬁrms who are listed
but whose trading volume is too low to enter the premier marché. Both markets have on
a v e r a g es o m e3 0 0ﬁr m sl i s t e de a c hy e a r .
Along with accounting information, the DAFSA yearbook provides us with the names of
the CEO (directeur général or président du directoire), the chairman (président du conseil
d’administration or président du conseil de surveillance) and the non-executive directors
(administrateurs or membre du conseil de surveillance). Henceforth, we will use the words
“non executive directors” and “directors” interchangeably, since their meanings are identical
in the French context. As it turns out however, most CEOs (directeur général) also hold the
title of chairman of the board (président du conseil d’administration). Only when the ﬁrm
is a “société à directoire” (a special legal form imported from German law), is the CEO
prevented from holding the chairman seat.
We retrieved personal information on the CEOs and the directors using two data sources.
The ﬁrst one is the Who’s Who in France, a list of prominent people in politics, business
and entertainment. For each individual, the available information is well standardized and
includes self-reported measures of parent’s occupation, place and date of birth, marital status,
number of children, education, current occupation and past career (with positions in ﬁrms,
ﬁrms’ names, and dates of entry or accessions to the positions). Each individual listed in the
DAFSA database was coded using his or her ﬁrst and last names. The matching process
has been done by hand for all CEOs, Chairmen and Outside Directors from 1992 until 2003,
using the 1994 and 2000 issues of the Who’s Who. On average, some 51% of all CEOs of
a l ll i s t e dc o r p o r a t i o n sw e r er e t r i e v e di nt h eW h o ’ sW h o . G i v e nt h a tw el o o ka tt h e1 9 9 4
and 2000 issues of the Who’s Who, this percentage shows a steady decline over the period
under study, from some 60% in the beginning to 45% in 2003. This ﬁgure is somewhat lower
12for directors, with approximately 36% of them being listed in the Who’s Who. Again, this
percentage goes down from 40 to 27% over the period.
The second source of data on directors and CEOs are the directories of both Polytech-
nique and ENA graduates, which are exhaustive, in contrast to the Who’s Who. These
directories provide the obvious information about education, but no information about the
socio-economic background and very little information about career (bureaucratic career -
Corps d’Etat - if any). All CEO and director names present in the DAFSA database over
the 1992 until 2003 were cross-checked using these directories. Given that we are looking at
directories of graduates, almost 100% of ENA and Polytechnique graduates who were CEOs,
chairmen, or board members of our listed ﬁr m sc a nb ea s s u m e dt oh a v eb e e ni n c l u d e di no u r
analysis ﬁle.8
Relying on the historical and sociological evidence reviewed above we identify three net-
works9 in our sample: (1) ENA graduates, all former high ranking civil-servants, (2) Poly-
technique graduates who had a career as “civil service” engineers and (3) Polytechnique
graduates who spent their whole career in the private sector. We now turn to a descriptive
investigation of our data to see how these three networks are prevalent among the directors
and CEOs of large listed corporations.
3.2 The French Business Elite in the 1990s
A raw inspection of our data conﬁrms and updates the ﬁndings of sociologists on a much
larger sample. First, Polytechnique and ENA graduates dominate the French business elite,
as do civil-servants. Second, this pattern has become even more pronounced over the recent
period for which we have data (1992-2003).
[Insert Tables 1,2]
Indeed, the data are fully consistent with the sociological and historical evidence outlined
above. Over the 1992-2003 period, (1) ENA and Polytechnique graduates run the lion’s share
of French ﬁrms, and (2) former civil-servants, in particular those actively involved in politics
also run a large share of the ﬁrms. As can be seen from Table 1, ENA and Polytechnique
graduates run, on average, some 20% of the ﬁrms; while this may appear small, their ﬁrms
are on average very large, since they correspond to some 70% of all assets traded on the
Stock Exchange (at book value). This pattern can still be found if we restrict our focus to
civil-servants that were “cabinet” advisors, who run 6% of the ﬁrms, but 52% of the assets.
8Apart from ambiguity in a name and surname, as, for instance, when both are very common.
9In a previous version of this paper, available from the authors upon request, we used a ﬁner breakdown,
based on “Corps d’Etat” or political aﬃliation. Results were essentially similar to those presented here.
13[Insert Figures 1,2]
Second, in spite of a vigourous process of privatization accompanied by the deregulation
of many sectors of the economy during the nineties, civil-servants remain prevalent amongst
t o pe x e c u t i v e so fF r e n c hc o r p o r a t i o n sa sl a t ea st h ee a r l y2 0 0 0 s .F i g u r e1s h o w st h ec h a n g e
in the asset-weighted share of CEOs from various backgrounds. During the 1990s, civil-
servants with pure administrative background - ENA graduates - became more and more
prevalent. In addition, Polytechnique “engineers”, either from the civil service or from the
private sector declined sharply after 1999. Last, this movement started with the resumption
of privatizations under the right-wing government, elected in 1993. SOEs run by former
civil-servants started to be sold to the public starting from that date on.
Figure 2 looks at the trend in board composition: it shows the change in the (asset-
weighted) share of directorships held by ENA graduates, Polytechnique graduates with a
career in the civil service and Polytechnique graduates with a pure private sector back-
ground. These shares are both very high and show a strong upward trend in the early 1990s,
right when privatizations resume (1993). In asset weighted terms, between 40 and 50% of
all director seats were ﬁlled with members of one of these three networks. Strikingly, with-
out even mentioning this particular feature of French business elites, two reports on “best
corporate governance practices”, issued in 1995 and 1999 (Viénot I and II), focused on the
appointment of “independent directors” to solve governance problems.
Figures 1 and 2 display similar evolutions: over the the 1990s ENA graduates became
more and more prevalent both as directors and CEOs, while polytechnique graduates, in par-
ticular those linked with the civil service, lost ground. This, along with sociological evidence
on French elites, suggests a relation between board composition and the CEO’s identity:
ENA graduate CEOs may be more likely to appoint ENA graduates as non executive direc-
tors.
A preliminary investigation indeed supports this claim: CEO’s identity matters for shap-
ing board composition. As Table 3 shows, the fraction of ENA graduates seating on the board
of corporations run by ENA graduates is much higher than in other corporations. The same
result holds for Polytechnique graduates when they have a civil service background but not
for those “polytechniciens” with an entire career in the private sector.10
[Insert Table 3]
This ﬁrst direct look at the data indeed suggests that social networks shape the composi-
tion of corporate boards. It is still unclear, though, which structural parameters is identiﬁed
10Similar tables, using various distinctions such as political aﬃliation, are also compelling. We omitted
them to save space.
14by this simple inspection of Table 3. Do we simply measure that ENA graduates are better
directors, and hence more sought-after ? Do we simply measure the fact that some ﬁrms
naturally attract ENA graduates as directors and CEOs - potentially because they operate in
regulated industries, or because the business requires a good knowledge of the bureaucracy ?
Or do we capture the fact that ENA CEOs run larger ﬁrms, that have larger boards and are
thus more likely to appoint ENA directors ? To circumvent these diﬃculties, before looking
at the networks per se,w eb r i e ﬂy describe the empirical model we use in our exploration of
the data, and then derive simple, easy to estimate reduced-form equations that will allow us
to recover the parameters we want to identify. And, of course, this will help us interpret the
results presented in Table 3.
4E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g y
Appointment of a director depends on each potential applicant’s skills, in particular her
own social networks and whether it overlaps with that (those) of the CEOs. This simple
statement generates a model which is diﬃcult to estimate in general, even with the data at
hand. However, this model can be transformed through various aggregations and elimination
of nuisance parameters into relations that can be estimated. These transformations from the
structural (economic) model to these aggregated and estimable forms are not straightforward.
Therefore, this Section carefully spells out how the structural model translates into various
estimable models.
4.1 The “Economic” Model
Consider the (matched employer - employee) panel where individuals are indexed by i, ﬁrms
by j, and time by t. We assume the existence of several (possibly overlapping) networks,
which we index by k. As in Munshi (2003), we try to identify whether belonging to the same
network as that of the ﬁrm’s CEOs increases the chance for individual i to be appointed at
ﬁrm j’s board. We thus start by formulating the following linear11 probability employment
model:














where Eijt =1if individual i w o r k sa sad i r e c t o ro fﬁrm j at date t,a n dEijt =0otherwise.
k is an index for the network. Ak
i =1when individual i belongs to network k, and zero
otherwise. Ck
jt is equal to 1 when the CEO of ﬁrm j at t belongs to network k, and zero
11Given that the probability for a given - even if well connected - individual to be hired at a given ﬁrm’s
board are small, a linear probability model seems to be a correct approximation.
15otherwise. Zjt is a vector of ﬁrm level observables. Xit is a vector of individual level
observables. αi and βj are vectors of individual and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. M is a matrix of
coeﬃcients that stand for the various interaction terms between variables of Xit and variables
of Zjt.
In equation (1), we measure the strength of social networks by looking at the λkl coef-
ﬁcients. If network eﬀects are really present, then we should observe that being appointed
as a director in ﬁrm j occurs more frequently when the individual and the CEO share the
same network. Hence,
H0: λkk >λ kl for all l 6= k
corresponds to evidence of network eﬀe c t si nt h ep a t t e r n so fn o m i n a t i o n .
Obviously, ﬁn d i n gd i r e c t o r sa n dC E O sf r o mt h es a m en e t w o r ki nt h es a m ec o m p a n yi snot
always evidence of networks. It could be the, say, former civil servants, tend to join larger
ﬁrms, ﬁrms that operate in regulated industries, or ﬁrms that are dependent on procurement
contracts. It could be, also, that former civil servants are more clever, and that large ﬁrms
prefer to hire clever people both as CEOs and directors. This is why equation (1) adds
three types of controls. First, the term αi.Zjt stands for the unobserved propensity of people
αi to serve as directors of companies with observables Zjt - for instance, high IQ workers
may obtain seats at the boards of large ﬁrms. Second, βj.Xit measures the unobserved ﬁrm
propensity βj to hire directors with observables Xit - for instance, ﬁrms with an authoritarian
corporate culture may prefer to hire older directors. Taken together, these two terms control
for the sorting of directors and ﬁrms along one dimension that is observable, and another
that is not.
The third control Z0
jt.M.Xit stands for matching of directors and ﬁrms along purely
observable dimensions. For instance, former civil servants may tend to join the boards of
former state owned entreprises, engineers may sort in more technology intensive industries,
or educated directors may be more often found in larger ﬁrms. The elements of the M matrix
measure how strong this sorting along observables is in the data.
Model (1) cannot be estimated as such. Indeed, the original data is restricted to observa-
tions for which Eijt =1 . Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to generate all observations
for which Eijt =0 . For instance, we do not know who applied as a director to any given
ﬁrm j and was not considered or even rejected. One solution could be to assume that all
individuals applied to all ﬁrms. However, all individuals not included in the data are poten-
tial applicants. Another problem with this approach is computational as there are, a priori,
some 600 ﬁrms and 5,000 directors every year. Over 10 years, the sample of all (i,j,t) would
therefore feature some 30 millions observations ! Hence, in the next subsection we restrict
attention to the “Eijt =1 ” observations and derive estimable models that only require such
16observations.
4.2 The Firm-Level Model
This section shows how model (1), expressed as a match between an individual and a ﬁrm,
may be aggregated as a ﬁrm-level model and which parameters of (1) can be identiﬁed. Let









be the total number of directors sitting at ﬁrm j’ sb o a r d ,w h ob e l o n gt on e t w o r kk. njt >n k
jt
is the total number of directors of j. nk
t is the total number of members of network k and
ﬁnally n is the total labor force (total number of directors in the data source).
In the following derivation, we will assume for simplicity that Xit =1 , i.e. that directors
do not diﬀer according to observable characteristics. While this is admittedly a strong
assumption, this is one that we will be able to dispense with in the following section (where
we will derive the “individual level model”). The objective of this hypothesis is thus mostly
for clarifying purposes (but detailed calculations, without this assumption, are reported in
Appendix). After a few manipulations, which basically amount to computing nk
jt and njt



































jt is the proportion of members of network k ending at the board of j in excess
of the natural population proportion of people ending at the board of j.T h e ak.Zjt term
in equation (2) allows to control for ﬁrm - director matching along ﬁrm observables and
director unobserved charactieristics. This control is done simply by including the Zjt ﬁrm
level controls in the linear regression of Y k
jt on the CEO’s network Cm
jt.T h ebmk
t coeﬃcient
measures the relation between a CEO’s identity and the board composition, controlling
for the above ﬁxed eﬀects. These coeﬃcients are not exactly equal to the λ’s, because
any network can be present at a given ﬁrm’s board, as the mere result of its size in the
natural population. The expected fraction of m, even in the absence of network eﬀects,
would be nm/n. As a result, the speciﬁce ﬀect on k will be underestimated in the “ﬁrm
level” speciﬁcation if we do not correct for this bias.
17Finally, testing for the presence of networks is fairly straightforward. By comparing bkk
t
and bkl





t for all l 6= k
thus, by looking at the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of Ck
jt in the regressions explaining
(1) the proportion of members of k ending in j and (2) the proportion of members of l ending
in j.
4.3 The Individual-Level Model
Obviously, because our data sources have two dimensions, ﬁrm and individual, an equivalent
strategy can be derived using the individual dimension. The advantage of aggregating equa-
tion (1) at the individual level is that we can dispense with the assumption that directors are
identical with respect to observables (Xit =1 ). Symmetrically, it is convenient to assume
that ﬁrms are identical (Zjt =1 ). Thus, because in the derivation of the individual and ﬁrm
level models, we make diﬀerent assumptions on the matching process of directors to ﬁrms,










be the number of ﬁrms in which, simultaneously, i is a director and the CEO belongs to
network k.W ed e n o t eµk
t, the sample number of members of network k, µit,t h en u m b e ro f
board seats held by individual i and µt the overall number of board seats in the sample.
We now assume that Zjt =1 . Again, after straightforward manipulations described in







































Therefore, equation (3) explains, given individual i’s network, the excess share Wk
it of boards
in which i is sitting and where the CEO belongs to network k.T h ec o e ﬃcient dkm
t on the
director’s network Am
i measures the extent to which a CEO from k tends to hire preferentially
directors from k. This estimation strategy allows to control for the unobserved propensity
of ﬁrms to match with directors of known characteristics by including individual observables
as additional regressors.
184.4 Possible Biases
There are multiple sources of estimation biases; this section makes it clear which ones our
empirical strategy will be able to deal with. Obviously, measurement error — aside from hand-
typing errors — does not appear to be an issue, because we directly measure the network each
CEO belongs to. Of course, measurement error could arise if our categorization of the various
networks was inappropriate. Yet, unbiased mistakes in measuring networks would a priori
attenuate the magnitude and signiﬁcance of our estimates.
Second, remember that we could not recover the socio-economic background of all di-
rectors and CEOs, but only for those who happened to be present in the Who’s Who.12 It
could very well be that those individuals included in the Who’s Who are also those with
high “director” ability. Independently of being an ENA or a Polytechnique graduate, sheer
charisma, skills, or intensive networking are likely to be correlated with someone’s probabil-
ity of becoming a director. Our model includes a speciﬁc person eﬀect αi that controls for
this tendency. And because our ﬁrm-level model, by aggregating and diﬀerencing, eliminate
αi, this technique controls for such potential biases.
Third, our model controls for observable tendencies of ﬁrms to hire directors from par-
ticular networks, i.e. for instance ﬁrms in regulated industries may have a propensity to
hire former civil servants (the Z0
jt.M.Xit)t e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) .B u to u ra p p r o a c hd o e sn o t
control for unobservable ﬁrm “tastes” for some networks, as for example, when some ﬁrms,
because of their corporate culture, have a tradition of promoting and hiring engineers rather
than top level bureaucrats. This limitation of our approach is easy to see in the individual
level model (3) where we allowed director observables to vary (Xit 6=1 ). Let us look at
the propensity of ﬁrms to hire from particular networks; in the language of model (1), this
means Xit =( Am
i )m. As appears from equation (3), a linear regression will not be able
to identify this eﬀect (ck
t.Xit) separately from network eﬀects (dkm
t .Am
i ). Theoretically, it
would be possible to account for this by including a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect in equation (2) - see
the derivation in Appendix. Unfortunately, there is a very low turnover of ENA CEOs and,
most often, when they leave, their replacement CEO turns out to be another former ENA
graduate. Clearly, introduction of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects would not generate any well-identiﬁed
estimate in this situation. This fact therefore makes separate identiﬁcation of (1) a ﬁxed
tendency for a given ﬁrm to hire, say, ENA graduates from (2) the additional tendency
due to the fact that currently the CEO is an ENA graduate, virtually impossible using the
ﬁrm-level speciﬁcation (again, not in theory but in practice).
Fourth, it is impossible to control for sorting along unobservable characteristics on both
12Polytechnique and ENA graduates were all included, however, given that we had access to the directory
of all former students of these two schools.
19sides (pure unobservable matching). If directors with high IQ tend to join ﬁrms with high IQ
CEOs, and IQ is correlated with Grandes Ecoles graduation, our estimates will be upward
biased. This concern is diﬃcult to address. Fortunately, our networks are not only related
to elite school attendance, but also to a career in the civil service. Hence, our data will
allow us to compare (1) former civil-servants from diﬀerent top schools and (2) civil and non
civil-servant that graduated from the exact same school.
5E v i d e n c e o f N e t w o r k s
This section looks at network eﬀects using model (1) discussed just above; we estimate the
λkl parameters, which stand for the marginal probability, for a member of network l,t ob e
ad i r e c t o ri naﬁrm run by a CEO belonging to network k.
5.1 Estimating the Probability of Employment
In a ﬁrst step, let us assume away matching considerations and simply posit that Xit = Zjt =
1,w h i c hm e a n st h a ts o m eﬁrms have in general a higher tendency to appoint, and some
individual have a general tendency to be appointed. We will deviate from these assumption























where j indexes the ﬁrm and t indexes time. k stands for the network under scrutiny
(ENA, Polytechnique with civil service, Polytechnique without civil service). Equation (4)
is obtained by substracting equation (2) for network k from equation (2) for network 0.
Thus, the diﬀerence with the previous ﬁr ml e v e le q u a t i o ni st h a tw et a k eo n en e t w o r ka s
the reference. Now, the left-hand side variable is the fraction of members of network k
that are employed in ﬁrm j minus the fraction of members of reference network that are
employed in ﬁrm j.W e d e ﬁne the reference category to be members of neither ENA nor
Polytechnique networks. uk
jt is an error term and the indicator Cm
jt is equal to 1 whenever
ﬁrm’s j CEO belongs to network k. We are interested in the coeﬃcients of these indicator
variables (λmk−λm0), which have a very simple structural interpretation, since they measure
the probability for a member of a given network k to be a director of a ﬁrm run by a member
of network m, minus the probability that a member of k is a director in a ﬁrm run by a
CEO that does not belong to any of the networks.
[Insert Table 4]
20Table 4 reports estimates of (4) for all three networks of interest (ENA, Polytechnique
with civil service, Polytechnique without civil service). These regressions are jointly es-
timated using the SURE method, that permits error terms of the three equations to be
correlated with each others for a given ﬁrm. Indeed, for example, if a given ﬁrm has many
ENA directors, it is less likely that it has many Polytechnique graduates, so the two equa-
tions are not totally independent. We also allow the error terms to be correlated across
observations of a same ﬁrm using the White correction method for standard errors. The
bottom panel of table 4 provide tests of the null hypothesis of equality of coeﬃcients on
CEO across equations.
First, for civil servants, the coeﬃcient on CEO’s identity is always very strong and
economically signiﬁcant; the probability of being director in a ﬁrm is increased on average by
some 0.5-1 percentage points when the CEO belongs to one of the two civil service related
networks (graduates from ENA or Polytechnique). This is sizeable, given that, with 600
ﬁrms, the probability of being employed in given speciﬁc ﬁrm is on average some 0.2%.
Second, these results do not necessarily constitute very strong evidence of network im-
portance per se, since we are only comparing members of three networks to “mostly uncon-
nected” directors. We thus test our H0 hypotheses more directly by looking if, for a given
director, the probability of being employed in a ﬁrm run by a CEO of the same network
is signiﬁcantly higher. In other words we ask in equation (4) whether ckk >c km,f o ra l lm.
These tests are reported in the bottom rows of Table 4. Our results therefore show that
the most important networks are former ENA graduates, former Polytechnique graduates
with civil service career, but not Polytechnique graduates who went directly to the private
sector. These results are strong evidence that the intuitions of Kadushin (1995) and Franck
and Yasumoto (1998) were right: it is networks of former civil-servants, not networks of
engineers, that matter the most.
To conﬁrm the results obtained in Table 4, we used the individual-level model to run
similar regressions, and report the results in supplemntary Table A1. Given our assumptions
that Xit = Zjt =1 , results should be identical to the ﬁrm level model (4), assuming model (1)
is not misspeciﬁed. There, the dependent variable is the fraction of seats held by individual
i (at date t)t h a tc o r r e s p o n dt oﬁrms run by CEOs of network k. The explanatory variables
are describe the network of individual i. We run three regressions, one for each network,
and allow residuals to be correlated across the three equations of each given individual using
the SURE estimation technique. As it turns out, the same orders of magnitude and the
same test statistics are obtained with this alternative way of collapsing the data. The only
diﬀerence that emerges using this model is that ENA directors are as likely to sit on boards
of ﬁrms run by ENA CEOs as they are to sit on boards of ﬁrms run by Polytechnique civil
21servants. This suggests that diﬀerent civil service related networks have links with each
other, a pattern that we will ﬁnd again in subsequent analyses.
5.2 Estimating the Probability of Appointment
An important question raised by the previous regression results is whether CEO’s identity
matters, or whether it is simply a proxy for the board’s identity. Imagine for instance that
the CEO holds no real power in appointments, and that all the power in these matters
rests with the board of directors. In this case, the board is going to appoint CEOs that
are similar to the set of directors, implying that the causal relation is reversed. Though
this is still evidence of social networks interfering with the labor market, the direction of
the relation matters for corporate governance. Indeed, if the board turns out to be chosen
by the ﬁrm’s CEO - Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that this situation might very
well hold in the US -, the directors’ ability to monitor the management on behalf of the
shareholders might be severely impaired.13
To look at this issue, we do two things. First, we reestimate model (1), by looking at
appointments rather than employment. Hence, Eijt =1when i is appointed by ﬁrm j at
date t. We use the ﬁrm level aggregation and thus correlate the CEO’s identity with the
ﬁrm’s hiring policy, thus providing a more stringent test of social interactions.14 We then
ask whether the CEO’s identity in these appointment regressions is a proxy for initial board
composition by including in the regression the past number of directors in the board of either





























where the left-hand side variable is now the share of newly hired members of network k
hired by ﬁrm j minus the share of newly hired directors by j. #Am
jt is now the fraction of
members of network m already sitting on the board of ﬁrm j. Note that such a regression
could not be estimated using employment instead of appointment - as in the speciﬁcations
shown above - since faces the well-known reﬂection problem (Manski, 1993): if A and B are
similar and sitting on the same board, then it is diﬃcult to know whether A seats because
13Claude Bébéar, the former CEO of AXA, a large French insurance company, and a prominent ﬁgure
in French business, argues that ”board members are in general reluctant to ﬁre the president. One general
assembly after the other, a CEO has ”his” men appointed on the board of directors. They owe him their seats.
After a few years, the CEO seats with a board composed through personnal ties, various free masoneries,
student friendship and so forth.” (Bébéar, 2003).
14We also ran - results non reported - individual level regressions using appointments instead of employ-
ment, with pretty much the same estimates and success.
22of B or the reverse. By introducing some dynamics, this methodology makes some kind of
“Granger causality” argument: it is A who matters if A was on the board before B.
[Insert Table 5]
The results of these ﬁrm-level regressions for our three selected networks are presented
in Table 5. Estimation of all three equations is made jointly using the SURE methodology,
and allowing for ﬂexible correlation across observations of a same ﬁrm using the White cor-
rection. As above, industry and year indicators are included. To avoid spurious correlations,
explanatory variables are lagged one year. In the Table, columns 1 to 3 look at the equivalent
of (4), that is assuming c0
km =0 . Columns 4 to 6 add the past board composition controls.
The regression results from columns 1 to 3 conﬁrm previous ﬁndings; education (ENA
and Polytechnique vs the rest) and career (civil service vs private sector) networks aﬀect
the allocation of directors to ﬁrms, even when analyzing nominations. Results from columns
4 to 6 support the idea that CEO’s identity, not board composition, explain the selective
directors’ appointments. First, even though inclusion of the board composition variables
reduces slightly the diﬀerence between coeﬃcients on CEO’s identity (compare tests values
for the ﬁrst regression with those for the second), all c0
km coeﬃcients for board composition are
signiﬁcant and strongly positive. All tests give results virtually identical to those presented
in Table 4. In addition, we now have similar results for boards: boards dominated by former
civil servants tend to recruit new directors from the networks (Polytechnique or ENA) they
belong to.
5 . 3 W h e nD i r e c t o r sa n dC E O sS o r to nO t h e rD i m e n s i o n s
Last, we assess the biases arising from the fact that directors may sort with ﬁrms according
to observable or unobservable characteristics. As suggested in section 4.4, we run ﬁrm
level regressions including average individual characteristics and individual level regressions
including ﬁrm level characteristics, and see if our results still hold.
[Insert Table 6]
We start by reestimating our ﬁrm-level regressions including observable ﬁrm characteris-
tics, as in equation (2): a dummy equal to one for former SOEs, industry dummies as well
as the ﬁrm’s past proﬁtability (as measured by ROA lagged by one year). This approach
allows us to take into account the fact that these observables matter for directors endowed
with particular, unobservable, characteristics that might be correlated with networks. This
is done in the ﬁr s tt h r e ec o l u m n so ft a b l e6 ,f o re a c ho ft h et h r e en e t w o r k sw ef o c u so n .
23As it turns out, these controls do not aﬀect our estimates very much. The only change is
that now ﬁrms run by ENA graduates are as likely to hire former civil servants from ENA than
from Polytechnique. This does not aﬀect our general conclusion that civil-servants networks
are active, while those related to a Grande Ecole (Polytechnique) without bureaucratic career
are not. Accounting for other possible sorting processes, that could be overlapping with
network eﬀects, does not aﬀect our results neither quantitatively nor qualitatively.
In supplementary Table A2, we use individual level regressions to control for director
characteristics (age and years of education), instead of ﬁrm level characteristics. Results
obtained are similar to what was reported in Table A1.
6R e a l E ﬀects of Social Networks
The above results suggest that networks of former high ranking civil-servants seem to be
particularly active in shaping board composition. When the CEO is a former civil-servant
(whether a graduate from Ecole Polytechnique or ENA), the fraction of directors from the
same background is larger.
The existing literature in labor economics suggests that such arrangements might be
optimal: CEOs use their own social networks to “grease the wheels” to ﬁnd more appropriate
directors. One obvious cost here is nepotism, i.e. CEOs using their networks to hire friends
rather than appropriate directors. The conﬂict of interest is particularly strong in the present
case, as directors are supposed to monitor the CEO, and friends are obviously less likely to
be “tough” supervisors. Theoretical models in labor economics assume that shareholders can
design an optimal contract with the referee (here, the CEO). In this case, perverse eﬀects
such as nepotism, are dominated by beneﬁcial eﬀects in equilibrium. This assumption is,
however, unlikely to hold in the context of large, publicly traded corporations such as the
ones we study here.
As argued above, an important function of the board of directors in a corporation is to
discipline the management in order to make it act in the ﬁrm’s shareholders interests. In
some extreme cases, when it becomes clear that a change in strategy is needed and cannot
be implemented by the current management, this might force the CEO to resign. This is,
however, likely to occur too late if some directors and the CEO belong to the same social
network and are tied by social connections. Then, the CEO might be able to retaliate on
any hostile action undertaken by his directors, even if he loses his job, or in contrast might
b ea b l et ob r i b e-b e c a u s eo ft h e i rc o m m o nr e l a t i o n s-h i sd i r e c t o r sm o r ee ﬃciently.
Hence, we ask if well connected CEOs are less likely to be forced out when their ﬁrm
performs badly. There is a long tradition in the corporate governance literature to investigate
24CEO turnover to performance sensitivity. In the spirit of this literature, we start with the
following logistic regression:
Tjt = α + β.PERFjt + δ.controlsjt + εjt (5)
where Tjt is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the CEO loses her job over the next year
(between t and t +1 ). PERFjt is an industry adjusted measure of corporate performance
(we use here return on assets, i.e. EBIT over assets). Following Weisbach (1988), we ask if
the number of directors that we label as “insiders” aﬀects β. This leads us to estimate the
following equation:
Tjt = α +( β0 + β1.insidersjt + β2.controlsjt).PERFjt ++ δ.controlsjt + εjt (6)
where controls include board size (as measured by log(number of directors)), ownership
concentration (as measured by the fraction of votes held by the largest block holder), a
dummy equal to 1 when the CEO is not chairman of the board of directors (which is always
t h ec a s ew h e nt h eﬁrm has a German style two tier board structure), and a dummy equal
to 1 when the ﬁrm is or has been state controlled in the past. These controls enter both
additively, but also as interactions with our performance. Indeed, the ﬁnance literature
has shown that (1) large board may be less eﬃcient monitors (Yermack (1996)) and thus
should decrease turnover to performance sensitivity (β2 > 0) and (2) large shareholders are
more eﬃcient monitors (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) and thus should increase turnover to
performance sensitivity (β2 < 0). There also some suspicions that CEOs cannot reduce the
odds of getting ﬁred when they do not chair the board of directors (β2 > 0). Finally, given
that, as we saw above, social networks related to civil service are the most active, it is also
natural to control for a potentially diﬀerent behavior of ﬁrms who have either been recently
privatized, or ﬁrms that are still partially owned by the government. One clear possibility is
that these ﬁrms are, from a general standpoint, less well governed and therefore have lower
turnover to performance sensitivity for reasons beyond the management’s social networks
(β2 > 0).
The coeﬃcient of interest here is β1, which measures the extent to which a board with
insiders may reduce the odds of ﬁring the CEO in case of bad performance. In a cross
section of US ﬁrms, Weisbach (1988) has shown that this is the case for ﬁrms whose board
is dominated by former employees, current employees, or suppliers of the ﬁrm. The analysis
conducted above suggests that, at least in the French context, a more relevant measure of
inside directors rests on computing the number of directors that belong to the same social
network as the CEO. We proceed by identifying social networks as in the above analysis: ENA
graduates, Polytechnique graduates with a past career in the civil service, and Polytechnique
graduates with a pure private sector background.
25[Insert Table 7]
Logistic regression results are reported in Table 7. We restrict ourselves to the sample of
CEOs aged less than 65, in order to reduce the chances that turnover be due to retirement.15
First, column 1 reports the plain CEO turnover regressions without network eﬀects (i.e.
assuming β2 =0 ). As it turns out, the sensitivity of turnover to performance is large and
statistically signiﬁcant at 5%. Other things equal, a one standard deviation reduction in
adjusted ROA (by about 6 percentage points) increases the probability of next year CEO
turnover by 37 percentage points. This is not surprising since a simple cross tabulation
shows that, for ﬁrms experiencing CEO turnover, average industry adjusted ROA is only 1.8
percentage lower than what it is for ﬁrms with stable CEOs. Column 1 also shows that other
controls have little, if any, explanatory power on the sensitivity of turnover to performance.
As it turns out, ﬁrms with a two tier board and ﬁrms with large shareholders tend to oust
t h e i rC E O sl e s so f t e nw h e np e r f o r m a n c ed e t e r i o r a t e s . T h i si sa to d d sw i t hi n t u i t i o nb u t
statistically insigniﬁcant. Less surprisingly, former SOEs do indeed seem to have a weaker
governance, although the diﬀerence is, again, insigniﬁcant. This pattern is unchanged once
w ec o n t r o lf o rt h ep r e s e n c eo fi n s i d ed i r e c t o r s( c o l u m n s2t o5 ) .
We then look at the eﬀect of inside directors on turnover to performance sensitivity.
Column 2 takes as our measure of insiders a dummy equal to 1 if the board of directors has
at least two ENA graduates, when the CEO is also an ENA graduate.A si tt u r n so u t ,t h e
diﬀerence in sensitivity between ﬁrms with inside dierctors and ﬁrms without inside directors
is large and statistically signiﬁcant at 1%. Point estimates suggest that, in the absence of
inside directors, a one standard deviation reduction in adjusted ROA leads to an increase by
33 percentage point in the probability of CEO turnover. In the presence of inside directors,
the same performance reduction actually leads to a decrease of turnover probability which
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Columns 3 and 4 look at networks of Polytechnique alumni. Column 3 focuses on Poly-
technique graduates with a past in the civil service, a network that we have shown to be active
in the above analysis. Thus deﬁned, the presence of inside directors reduces the turnover to
performance sensitivity of ﬁrms, albeit to a smaller extent than for networks of ENA gradu-
ates. Also, the diﬀerence is statistically insigniﬁcant. One possibility is that there simply to
few of these CEOs and directors to identiﬁyn e t w o r k se ﬀects properly. Alternatively, these
networks may be blended into the more general network of former high ranking civil servants
(we investigate this in column 5). In column 4, we just look at Polytechnique graduates with
pure private sector background. The analysis above suggests that such networks do not ap-
15The distribution of CEO age at turnover date indeed has a spike around 65.
26pear to shape board of directors composition, as Polytechnique CEOs are as likely as other
CEOs to hire polytechnique directors. Consistently with this ﬁnding, boards with CEOs
from Polytechnique and Polytechnique directors do shake up the incumbent management as
often as other ﬁrms when performance worsens.
In Column 5, we ask if the overall network of former civil servants from ENA or Poly-
technique actually aﬀect corporate governance. It is natural to put these networks together
because Tables 4 and 6 have shown that ENA CEOs also tend to hire civil servants with a
Polytechnique degree. This suggest that there exists a larger networks of former high ranking
civil servants. We thus use a dummy equal to 1 when the board of directors has at least two
members of either network and the CEO belongs to one of these networks. Consistently with
the estimates reported in columns 2 and 3, civil servant networks appear strongly associated
with reduced monitoring of management. The turnover to performance sensitivity of ﬁrms
with such insiders is equal to zero, while it is strongly negative for the rest of the population.
The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%.
7 Conclusion: Social Networks and Corporate Perfor-
mance
This paper has shown that social networks do indeed seem to shape board composition.
We used French data because the history and sociology of the French business elite make it
fairly easy to measure if a given CEO or director belongs to a given network. As it turns
out, network of former bureaucrats are the most active in determining board composition,
controlling for both directors and ﬁrm characteristics. This phenomenon seems to have real
implications in terms of corporate governance, ﬁrms with directors and CEOs with a past
career in the civil service are less likely to change CEO when performance is bad. This
suggests that social networks may serve as a clean way to measure non executive director
independence. This is interesting for France, where the Anglo-saxon notion of independence
has little grip: the appointment of an employee on the board of non executive directors is
not a common practice. This is also interesting beyond France because it suggests that there
must ways (like social networks) to measure director independence more accurately than by
using the traditional measure that the existing literature has documented.
Are there more tangible side eﬀects of such bad governance ? When we look at per-
formance, ﬁrms run by former civil-servants are systematically less proﬁtable than average,
although the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant only for those CEOs who were “cabinet” ad-
visor at some point in their career (which roughly corresponds to 50% of them), i.e. who
are politically-connected CEOs. We provide a description and an explanation for this re-
27sult in a companion paper (Bertrand, Schoar, Kramarz and Thesmar, 2005): our contention
there is that labor demand from these ﬁrms is more sensitive to the political cycle, as their
politically-connected CEOs “lend” jobs to incumbent politicians. We also provide suggestive
evidence that such job creation helps reelection, but hampers corporate proﬁtability. The
present paper provides an explanation as to why these CEOs remain in power, even though
they do not make the most eﬃcient use of the ﬁrm’s assets: they, not the investors, are the
ones who govern the company.
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9.1 Identifying Power of the Firm-Level Model




































































































































so that b α
k
t is the average ﬁxed eﬀect (ability to ﬁnd any kind of directorship) of all members
of network k. c Xk
t is the average Xit for all individuals of network k.























































































so that b α
k
t is the average ﬁxed eﬀect (ability to ﬁnd any kind of directorship) of all the labor
force.
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be the number of ﬁrm in which i is a director, whose CEO belongs to network k.A g a i n ,w e
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again, we divide by µt,t h eo v e r a l ln u m b e ro fﬁrms at date t:
µit
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Figure 2: Board Composition of French Listed Corporations : 1992 - 2003
3511 Tables
Table 1: Firm Level Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev. Min Max Asset Weighted Mean
CEO Background
ENA graduate 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.54
Polytechnique, former civil servant 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.08
Polytechnique, always private sector 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.33
In Who’s Who 0.51 0.50 0 1 0.88
Former civil servant 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.65
Former "cabinet" advisor 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.52
Outside Directors
Total Number 6.9 3.8 1 26 -
At least one ENA 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.90
At least one polytechnique, CS 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.59
At least one polytechnique, PS 0.36 0.48 0 1 0.81
Firm Characteristics
Former SOE 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.64
Currently SOE 0.04 0.20 0 1 0.13
Pct shares held by major block holder 50.8 25.1 0 100 27.0
Firm Performance
Assets (bn Euros) 5.5 45,7 -
Return on Assets 0.06 0.06 -0.13 0.27 -
Return on Equity 0.16 0.19 -0.79 0.88 -
Tobin’s Q 1.3 0.8 0.3 6.6 -
Age (years) 62 48 0 327 -
Note: French public ﬁrms over the 1994-2001 period. Source: DAFSA diary of public ﬁrms for the
names of the directors. Who’s Who and School Diaries
36Table 2: Director Level Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev. Asset weighted mean
Positions
# of CEO seats 0.1 0.4 0.3
# of director seats held 1.9 1.7 3.0
Past Career and Education
ENA graduate 0.08 0.27 0.26
Polytechnique, once civil servant 0.04 0.19 0.07
Polytechnique, always private sector 0.10 0.30 0.17
Is in Who’s Who 0.37 0.48 0.57
Former civil servant 0.12 0.32 0.33
Former "cabinet" advisor 0.06 0.24 0.20
Age 60 10 -
Note: French public ﬁrms over the 1994-2001 period. Source: DAFSA diary of public ﬁrms for the
names of the directors. Who’s Who and School Diaries
Table 3: Preliminary Evidence on Networks
Board Composition as a Function of the CEO’s Background
CEO Education/career
All ENA Poly., C.S. Poly., P.S. Other
Non weighted averages
% of ENA graduates 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.05
% of Poly. graduates, civil servants 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.02
% of Poly. graduates, private sector 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.06
% of other 0.84 0.69 0.63 0.76 0.87
Asset weighted averages
% of ENA graduates 0.25 0.31 0.23 0.22 0.11
% of Poly. graduates, civil servants 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.02
% of Poly. graduates, private sector 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.09
% of other 0.56 0.47 0.51 0.61 0.77
Note: French public ﬁrms over the 1992-2001 period. Source: DAFSA diary of public ﬁrms for the
names of the directors. Who’s Who and School Diaries
37Table 4: Econometric Evidence on Networks




ENA Poly, C.S. Poly, P.S.
CEO is ENA 0.6∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
CEO is Polytechnique 0.5∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗
& former civil servant (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
CEO is Polytechnique 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗
& always private sector (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)




Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(1) 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(3) 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(1) 0.50
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(2) 0.97
Note: SURE estimates - Standard errors between brackets. Residual are allowed to be correlated
across equations and observations of the same ﬁrm. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Source: DAFSA yearbook of listed companies for accounting variables and Who’s Who in France
(1994 and 2000 issues) for directors’ education. Polytechnique and ENA graduates directories for
CEOs.
38Table 5: Econometric Evidence on Networks
Eﬀect of the CEO’s Background on Director Appointment
Firm level regressions
Among newly appointed (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
directors, fraction of: ENA Poly, C.S. Poly, P.S. ENA Poly, C.S. Poly, P.S.
CEO is ENA 0.13∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
CEO is Polytechnique 0.10∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.02
& former civil servant (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
CEO is Polytechnique 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
& always private sector (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
% of ENA directors (-1) - - - 0.35∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
%o fP o l y ,f o r m e rC . S . - - - 0 . 1 7 ∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.02
directors (-1) (0.05) (0.11) (0.03)
%o fP o l y . ,a l w a y sP . S . - - - 0 . 0 9 ∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗∗∗
directors (-1) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6,759 6,757
Test ENA(1)=ENA(2) 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Test ENA(1)=ENA(3) 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(1) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(3) 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(1) 0.72 0.18
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(2) 0.99 0.87
Note: SURE estimates - Standard errors between brackets. Residual are allowed to be correlated
across equations and observations of the same ﬁrm. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Source: DAFSA yearbook of listed companies for accounting variables and Who’s Who in France
(1994 and 2000 issues) for directors’ education. Polytechnique and ENA graduates directories for
CEOs.
39Table 6: Econometric Evidence on Networks
Robustness to Additional Sorting Variables
Firm level model
Among currently employed (1) (2) (3)
directors, fraction of: ENA Poly, C.S. Poly, P.S.
CEO is ENA 0.5∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.1∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
CEO is Polytechnique 0.4∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗
& former civil servant (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
CEO is Polytechnique 0.1∗ 0.1 0.2∗∗∗
& always private sector (0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Former SOE dummy yes yes yes
Past year ﬁrm ROA yes yes yes




Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(1) 0.01∗∗∗
Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(3) 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(1) 0.35
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(2) 0.36
Note: SURE estimates - Standard errors between brackets. Residual are allowed to be correlated
across equations and observations of the same ﬁrm. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Source: DAFSA yearbook of listed companies for accounting variables and Who’s Who in France
(1994 and 2000 issues) for directors’ education. Polytechnique and ENA graduates directories for
CEOs.
40Table 7: CEO Turnover: Do Networks Matter ?
41Losing CEO Position in the Forthcoming Year
CEO belongs to: Base ENA Poly, CS Poly, PS ENA or poly CS
Industry Adj. ROA -7.7∗∗ -9.7∗∗∗ -8.1∗∗ -7.9∗∗∗ -9.8∗∗
(3.9) (3.9) (4.0) (3.9) (4.2)
Industry Adj. ROA - 14.6∗∗∗ 3.2 3.2 10.1∗∗
× (# directors = CEO > 2) (5.0) (10.0) (5.1) (5.0)
(# directors = CEO > 2)- 0 . 2 1 . 1 ∗∗∗ 0.4 0.5∗
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
Industry Adj. ROA -5.5 -5.7 -6.0 -5.9 -6.1
× Former or current SOE (3.4) (4.4) (4.5) (4.4) (4.5)
Industry Adj. ROA 2.6 4.7 3.4 2.8 5.2
× % largest blockholder (5.8) (5.9) (5.9) (5.8) (6.2)
Industry Adj. ROA 2.8 3.7 2.7 2.8 3.4
× Two tier board (4.4) (4.3) (4.5) (4.5) (4.4)
Former/current SOE 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
% largest blockholder 1.4∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
Two tier board 0.4∗ 0.4∗ 0.4 0.4∗ 0.4
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
log(board size) 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Log(assets) 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629 1,629
Note: Logit estimates - Standard errors between brackets. Sample of all ﬁrms run by a CEO aged
less than 65. Error terms are clustered at the ﬁrm level. In all regressions, the dependant variable
is a dummy equal to 1 when the current CEO is not the CEO anymore next year. In column 1,
we simply regress this departure dummy on industry adjusted ﬁrm Return on Assets and controls.
We then interact this performance variable with a dummy equal to 1 when (1) the CEO belongs
to a network and (2) at least two directors belong to the same network. In column 2, network
is “ENA graduate”. In column 3, network is “Polytechnique graduate, civil service career”. In
column 4, network is deﬁned as “Polytechnique graduate, purely private sector career”. Columns
5 encompasses columns 2 and 3: network is deﬁned as “ENA graduate, or Polytechnique graduate
with career in the civil service”.
42Table A1: Econometric Evidence on Networks
Evidence From Individual Level Regressions
Individual level model
Among board seats held, fraction
of ﬁrms run by a CEO from
ENA Poly, C.S. Poly, P.S.
Director is ENA 0.6∗∗∗ 0.5∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.0)
Director is Polytechnique 0.3∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗
& former civil servant (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Director is Polytechnique 0.1∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
& always private sector (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)




Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(1) 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(3) 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(1) 0.48
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(2) 0.25
Note: SURE estimates - Standard errors between brackets. Residual are allowed to be correlated
across equations and observations of the same individual. All explanatory variables are lagged
by one year. Source: DAFSA yearbook of listed companies for accounting variables and Who’s
Who in France (1994 and 2000 issues) for directors’ education. Polytechnique and ENA graduates
directories for CEOs.
43Table A2: Robustness to Additional Sorting Variables
Evidence From Individual Level Regressions
Individual level model
Among board seats held, fraction
of ﬁrms run by a CEO from:
ENA Poly, C.S. Poly, P.S.
Director is ENA 0.5∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Director is Polytechnique 0.2∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗ 0.1
& former civil servant (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Director is Polytechnique 0.1 0.4∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗
& always private sector (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Director’s age yes yes yes




Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(1) 0.01∗∗∗
Test Poly, CS(2)=Poly, CS(3) 0.00∗∗∗
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(1) 0.67
Test Poly, PS(3)=Poly, PS(2) 0.07∗
Note: SURE estimates - Standard errors between brackets. Residual are allowed to be correlated
across observations and across equations for each given individual. All explanatory variables are
lagged by one year. Source: DAFSA yearbook of listed companies for accounting variables and
Who’s Who in France (1994 and 2000 issues) for directors’ education. Polytechnique and ENA
graduates directories for CEOs.
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